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Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing a good, where agents prefer
more to less. In this environment, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies
strategy-proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property:
no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next,
by constructing a system of linear equations, we provide a way to find
all of the strategy-proof sharing rules, and identify a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a non-constant, strategy-proof
sharing rule. Finally, we show that it is only the equal sharing rule
that satisfies strategy-proofness and symmetry.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of agents who are to share the operating cost of an orga-
nization. How do they share the operating cost? The agents usually pay
membership dues which are common to all of them to cover the cost. Such
a sharing rule is called the equal sharing rule. However, the equal sharing
rule appears inappropriate in the sense that it does not at all reflect agents’
types, such as intensities of preference. Why do not the agents use a sharing
rule that mirrors differences in their types? When we consider the problem,
it is important to keep in mind that each agent does not know about the
other agents’ types. Each agent may have an incentive to gain by manipu-
lating the sharing rule through misrepresentation of her types, because her
true type is unknown to the other agents.
In this paper, we consider the problem of sharing a good and search
for strategy-proof sharing rules, where each agent prefers more to less.12
Strategy-proofness is an incentive compatibility property that requires that
no agent should benefit from misrepresenting her types irrespective of types
reported by the other agents, which was introduced by the seminal papers
of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). The property seems attractive,
but it is too strong a requirement in the sense that it rules out almost all
rules in many environments.
A constant sharing rule, where the good is always split in a fixed ratio, is
a familiar rule that satisfies strategy-proofness. In addition to the constant
sharing rules, as is well-known, there exists a non-constant sharing rule that
satisfies strategy-proofness if there are three agents (see Example 1). The
non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rule demonstrated in Example 1 is a
bossy sharing rule, i.e., one where a change in an agent’s types affects not her
own share but the other agents’ shares.3 Besides the above sharing rules, is
there a strategy-proof sharing rule? The answer is no, as shown by Theorem
1. The theorem tells us that a sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and
only if each agent cannot affect her share at all through misrepresentation
of her types. This implies that it is only the bossy sharing rule that satisfies
strategy-proofness and non-constancy.
Bossiness might appear unreasonable, as Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein
(1981) state that “While we have not exhaustively considered this question,
we have identified one substantial consideration that bears on nonbossiness’s
reasonableness and desirability. It relates to simplicity of design.” However,
the property of bossiness is possessed by some of “nice” mechanisms, in-
cluding the Vickrey auction (Vickrey (1961)) and the Clarke–Groves mech-
1When considering the problem of sharing a cost, we alternatively assume that each
agent prefers less to more.
2A sharing rule is a function that assigns a list of shares to each announcement of
agents’ types.
3The notion of bossiness was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
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anisms (Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973)). Furthermore, non-bossiness is
demanding, because non-bossiness together with strategy-proofness implies
coalitional strategy-proofness in some environments such as pure exchange
economies (see Barbera` and Jackson (1995)) or the Shapley–Scarf housing
markets (see Pa`pai (2000)).4
In addition, consider the following example: There are three agents who
are to share a cost of a project, where each agent prefers less to more. Sup-
pose that each agent reports a different type and then their shares of the cost
are each (0.3, 0.2, 0.5). What should be selected as the “fair” shares when
agent 1’s announcement is changed to the same as agent 2’s? Some might in-
sist that the new shares should be each (0.2, 0.2, 0.6) since those who report
the same types should be treated as the same. This rule violates strategy-
proofness, because agent 1 benefits from the change in her announcements.
Others may urge that the new shares should be each (0.3, 0.3, 0.4). This rule
is a bossy, but not manipulable.
As mentioned above, the bossy sharing rule is not so unreasonable. So,
it is of interest to study how to find all of the strategy-proof sharing rules.
In Section 4, we construct a system of linear equations by using Theorem 1,
in the following way:
• Suppose that there are n agents having m types.
• Choose a ratio arbitrarily, which is the list of shares that agents receive
when they announce type 1.
• Choose a ratio such that agent i’s share remains unchanged, whenever
only agent i changes her announcement.
• Iterate the above operation for all agents.
Thus, we obtain mn linear equations in nmn−1 unknowns. By construction,
we can find any strategy-proof sharing rule by solving the linear system. In
Example 2, we demonstrate the linear system when there are three agents,
each of whom has two types.
Next we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a non-constant sharing rule by using the system of the linear equations.
We investigate some properties of the linear system and find a relationship
between the constancy of the strategy-proof sharing rule and the dimen-
sion of the solution set of the linear system. In conjunction with the fact
that the dimension of the solution space of it can be written as a function
of the number of agents and that of admissible types, the relationship im-
plies a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of
4Coalitional strategy-proofness is a group incentive compatibility property that requires
that no coalition of agents should be able to gain from joint misrepresentation. Note that
coalitional strategy-proofness is a stronger requirement than strategy-proofness.
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the non-constant and strategy-proof sharing rule: there exists a sharing rule
satisfying non-constancy and strategy-proofness if and only if there are at
least three agents, each of whom has at least two types (Theorem 4). This
makes a difference between the case of two-agent and three- or more-agent
(although the difference could be imagined from the example of Satterth-
waite and Sonnenschein (1981) in the pure exchange economy).
Finally, we examine whether there is a non-constant sharing rule that is
strategy-proof and fair . Our notion of fairness is such that if agents have the
same types, then they receive equal shares, which is usually called symmetry .
In Theorem 5, we prove that there is no sharing rule that satisfies symmetry,
strategy-proofness, and non-constancy. The theorem leads to Corollary 1
which asserts that it is only the equal sharing rule that is strategy-proof and
fair. This may be a reason why the equal sharing rule is used in practice for
resolving the sharing problem.
The Related Literature
Sprumont (1991) considered the division problem with single-peaked pref-
erences and showed that a division rule satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto
efficiency, and anonymity if and only if it is the uniform allocation rule (e.g.,
see Sprumont (1991) or Barbera` (2001) for details of the uniform allocation
rule). Later, Ching (1994) weakened anonymity to symmetry. The sharing
problem considered in our paper appears similar to the division problem
with single-peaked preferences. Indeed, our problem could be regarded as
a special case where each agent has the peak of her preference when she
receives the entire good. Therefore, it is possible to consider Corollary 1 as
a special case of the Ching (1994)’s result, since the uniform allocation rule
is equivalent to the equal sharing rule when each agent prefers more to less.
Our model is also analogous to the pure exchange economy model con-
sidered in Zhou (1991). Zhou (1991) showed that there is no mechanism that
is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and non-inversely-dictatorial in two-agent
pure exchange economies, and conjectured that a similar impossibility result
could be proved in three- or more-agent pure exchange economies.5 His con-
jecture implies that there is a difference in the possibility of the existence of
a non-constant, strategy-proof, and Pareto efficient mechanism in two-agent
versus n-agent settings, where n ≥ 3. Therefore, the difference implied by
Theorem 4 is similar to the difference implied by Zhou’s conjecture.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides notation and def-
initions. In Section 3, we characterize strategy-proof sharing rules. The
5However, Kato and Ohseto (2002) have recently proved that there exist some mech-
anisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and non-inversely-dictatorial in four- or
more-agent pure exchange economies. Nevertheless, as noted in Kato and Ohseto (2002),
Zhou’s conjecture is still open in three-agent pure exchange economies.
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system of linear equations is constructed in Section 4. Section 5 identifies
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a non-constant and
strategy-proof sharing rule. We search for a sharing rule that is fair and
strategy-proof in Section 6. Section 7 contains concluding remarks. Some
proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Notation and Definitions
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, where 2 ≤ n < +∞. Let
X :=
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+
∣∣ ∑
i∈N xi = 1
}
be the set of ratios, where agent
i ∈ N receives xi, which we call agent i’s share.
Let Θi be the set of possible types of agent i ∈ N . Each agent i ∈ N
has a utility function ui : X × Θi → R. We assume that each agent i ∈ N
is selfish, i.e., ui(x; θi) depends only on xi for any x ∈ X and any θi ∈ Θi.
Let Θmi :=
{
θ1i , θ
2
i , . . . , θ
m
i
} ⊂ Θi be a set of agent i’s types: θki ∈ Θmi
only if ui(·; θki ) is a strictly increasing function of xi. The domain is the set
Θm := Θm1 ×Θm2 ×· · ·×Θmn . A type profile is a list θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ Θm .
A sharing rule is a single-valued function f : Θm → X, which assigns a
list of shares x ∈ X to each type profile θ ∈ Θm . It will be convenient to
write f(θ) = (f1(θ), f2(θ), . . . , fn(θ)).
Now we introduce a property which the sharing rule is to satisfy. Strategy-
proofness is an incentive compatibility property, which requires that no agent
should be able to benefit from misrepresenting her types irrespective of the
other agents’ types.
Definition 1 (Strategy-proofness). A sharing rule f satisfies strategy-
proofness if, for all θ ∈ Θm and all i ∈ N , there is no θ′i ∈ Θmi such that
ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θi) > ui(f(θ); θi).
A sharing rule satisfying strategy-proofness is a constant sharing rule.
Definition 2 (Constant Sharing Rules). A sharing rule f is a constant
sharing rule if, for some x ∈ X, f(θ) = x for any θ ∈ Θm .
A dictatorial sharing rule, which always assigns the entire good to a given
agent, is a special case of the constant sharing rule. In order to distinguish
non-constant sharing rules from the constant sharing rules, we often impose
the following condition on the sharing rule.
Definition 3 (Non-constancy). A sharing rule f satisfies non-constancy
if, for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θm ,
f(θ) 6= f(θ′).
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3 Strategy-proof Sharing Rules
In this section, we investigate what kinds of sharing rules satisfy strategy-
proofness. Aside from constant sharing rules, there is a non-constant sharing
rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, as demonstrated in Example 1.
Example 1. Suppose that there are three agents, 1, 2, and 3, who are
to share a good worth $100 to each of them. Furthermore, suppose that
m = 2, i.e., for each agent, the set of types consists of only two types. Then,
a non-constant and strategy-proof sharing rule is the following:
f¯(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
1
3) = x
1 = (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)
f¯(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
1
3) = x
2 = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2)
f¯(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
1
3) = x
3 = (0.4, 0.2, 0.4)
f¯(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
1
3) = x
4 = (0.4, 0.1, 0.5)
f¯(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
2
3) = x
5 = (0.5, 0.4, 0.1)
f¯(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
2
3) = x
6 = (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)
f¯(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
2
3) = x
7 = (0.2, 0.4, 0.4)
f¯(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
2
3) = x
8 = (0.2, 0.3, 0.5).
The sharing rule is illustrated in Figure 1. ¥
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Figure 1: A Non-constant and Strategy-proof Sharing Rule
Example 1 shows that it is possible to design a non-constant sharing rule
that satisfies strategy-proofness if there are three agents.6 The following
theorem provides a full characterization of strategy-proof sharing rules.
6We shall show in Example 2 how to construct the non-constant, strategy-proof sharing
rule.
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Theorem 1. A sharing rule f satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if
fi(θ) = fi(θ′i, θ−i)
for all θ ∈ Θm , all i ∈ N , and all θ′i ∈ Θmi .
Proof. The only if part: Suppose to the contrary that fi(θ) 6= fi(θ′i, θ−i) for
some θ ∈ Θm , some i ∈ N , and some θ′i ∈ Θmi . Without loss of generality,
we assume fi(θ) > fi(θ′i, θ−i). Since ui(·; θ′i) is a strictly increasing function
of xi, we obtain
ui(f(θ); θ′i) > ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i); θ
′
i),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
The if part: It is easy to check that if fi(θ) = fi(θ′i, θ−i) for all θ ∈ Θm , all
i ∈ N , and all θ′i ∈ Θmi , then f satisfies strategy-proofness.
Theorem 1 tells us that a sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and
only if each agent never changes her own share by misrepresenting her types.
This does not lead to the constancy of the sharing rule, because it might
be a bossy sharing rule, i.e., one where each agent could change someone
else’s share through misrepresentation of her types, even though she cannot
affect her own share. Nevertheless, the bossy sharing rule is quasi-constant ,
in the sense that each agent never affects her own share by changing her
announcements. In this sense, Theorem 1 could be deemed to be an impos-
sibility result.
It follows from Theorem 1 that non-bossiness is inconsistent with strategy-
proofness and non-constancy. This reveals a stark contrast between our
model and other models such as the pure exchange economy model or the
model considered in Sprumont (1991), because non-bossiness is consistent
with strategy-proofness and non-constancy in the models (see Barbera` and
Jackson (1995) for the pure exchange economy model, and Barbera`, Jackson,
and Neme (1997) for Sprumont’s model).
4 The Linear System
Let us construct a system of linear equations to find all strategy-proof shar-
ing rules. Let f : Θm → X be a strategy-proof sharing rule. Then, by
Theorem 1, we have the following:
f(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
1
1, x
1
2, x
1
3, . . . , x
1
n−1, x
1
n)
f(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
1
1, x
2
2, x
2
3, . . . , x
2
n−1, x
2
n)
...
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f(θm1 , θ
1
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
1
1, x
m
2 , x
m
3 , . . . , x
m
n−1, x
m
n )
f(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
2
1, x
1
2, x
m+1
3 , . . . , x
m+1
n−1 , x
m+1
n )
f(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
2
1, x
2
2, x
m+2
3 , . . . , x
m+2
n−1 , x
m+2
n )
...
f(θm1 , θ
2
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
2
1, x
m
2 , x
m+m
3 , . . . , x
m+m
n−1 , x
m+m
n )
...
f(θ11, θ
m
2 , θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
m
1 , x
1
2, x
m(m−1)+1
3 , . . . , x
m(m−1)+1
n−1 , x
m(m−1)+1
n )
f(θ21, θ
m
2 , θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
m
1 , x
2
2, x
m(m−1)+2
3 , . . . , x
m(m−1)+2
n−1 , x
m(m−1)+2
n )
...
f(θm1 , θ
m
2 , θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
m
1 , x
m
2 , x
m(m−1)+m
3 , . . . , x
m(m−1)+m
n−1 , x
m(m−1)+m
n )
...
f(θm1 , θ
m
2 , θ
m
3 , . . . , θ
m
n−1, θ
1
n) = (x
mn−2
1 , x
mn−2
2 , x
mn−2
3 , . . . , x
mn−2
n−1 , x
mn−1
n )
f(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n−1, θ
2
n) = (x
mn−2+1
1 , x
mn−2+1
2 , x
mn−2+1
3 , . . . , x
mn−2+1
n−1 , x
1
n)
...
f(θm1 , θ
m
2 , θ
m
3 , . . . , θ
m
n−1, θ
m
n ) = (x
mn−1
1 , x
mn−1
2 , x
mn−1
3 , . . . , x
mn−1
n−1 , x
mn−1
n ),
where xki ≥ 0.
Since
∑
i∈N fi = 1, we obtain the following:
x11 + x
1
2 + x
1
3+ · · ·+ x1n−1 + x1n = 1
x11 + x
2
2 + x
2
3+ · · ·+ x2n−1 + x2n = 1
...
x11 + x
m
2 + x
m
3 + · · ·+ xmn−1 + xmn = 1
x21 + x
1
2 + x
m+1
3 + · · ·+ xm+1n−1 + xm+1n = 1
x21 + x
2
2 + x
m+2
3 + · · ·+ xm+2n−1 + xm+2n = 1
...
x21 + x
m
2 + x
m+m
3 + · · ·+ xm+mn−1 + xm+mn = 1
...
xm1 + x
1
2 + x
m(m−1)+1
3 + · · ·+ xm(m−1)+1n−1 + xm(m−1)+1n = 1
xm1 + x
2
2 + x
m(m−1)+2
3 + · · ·+ xm(m−1)+2n−1 + xm(m−1)+2n = 1
...
xm1 + x
m
2 + x
m(m−1)+m
3 + · · ·+ xm(m−1)+mn−1 + xm(m−1)+mn = 1
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...
xm
n−2
1 + x
mn−2
2 + x
mn−2
3 + · · ·+ xm
n−2
n−1 + x
mn−1
n = 1
xm
n−2+1
1 + x
mn−2+1
2 + x
mn−2+1
3 + · · ·+ xm
n−2+1
n−1 + x
1
n = 1
...
xm
n−1
1 + x
mn−1
2 + x
mn−1
3 + · · ·+ xm
n−1
n−1 + x
mn−1
n = 1,
where xki ≥ 0.
By construction, solving the system of the mn linear equations in nmn−1
unknowns, we can find every strategy-proof sharing rule. To handle the
linear system easily, we put the equations into matrix form:

1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1


x11
x21...
xm1...
xm
n−2
1
xm
n−2+1
1 ...
xm
n−1
1
x12
x22...
xm2...
xm
n−2
2
xm
n−2+1
2 ...
xm
n−1
2 ...
x1n
x2n...
xmn
xm+1n
xm+2n...
x2mn...
x
m(m−1)+1
n
x
m(m−1)+2
n ...
x
m(m−1)+m
n ...
xm
n−1
n

= 1.
To simplify notation, let A denote the mn × nmn−1 coefficient matrix and
x denote the nmn−1 × 1 matrix.
The following example is helpful in understanding the linear system.
Example 2. Consider again the situation described in Example 1. Let f
be a sharing rule that satisfies strategy-proofness. Then, by Theorem 1, we
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have the following:
f(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
1
3) = (x
1
1, x
1
2, x
1
3)
f(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
1
3) = (x
1
1, x
2
2, x
2
3)
f(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
1
3) = (x
2
1, x
1
2, x
3
3)
f(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
1
3) = (x
2
1, x
2
2, x
4
3)
f(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
2
3) = (x
3
1, x
3
2, x
1
3)
f(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
2
3) = (x
3
1, x
4
2, x
2
3)
f(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
2
3) = (x
4
1, x
3
2, x
3
3)
f(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
2
3) = (x
4
1, x
4
2, x
4
3),
where xki ≥ 0. Since
∑
i∈N fi = 1, we have the following equations:
x11 + x
1
2 + x
1
3 = 1
x11 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 = 1
x21 + x
1
2 + x
3
3 = 1
x21 + x
2
2 + x
4
3 = 1
x31 + x
3
2 + x
1
3 = 1
x31 + x
4
2 + x
2
3 = 1
x41 + x
3
2 + x
3
3 = 1
x41 + x
4
2 + x
4
3 = 1,
where xki ≥ 0.
We solve the eight linear equations in twelve unknowns to find strategy-
proof sharing rules. The system of the linear equations is put into matrix
form:

1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1


x11
x21
x31
x41
x12
x22
x32
x42
x13
x23
x33
x43

= 1.
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Solving the linear system, we have
x11
x21
x31
x41
x12
x22
x32
x42
x13
x23
x33
x43

=

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

+ α1

−1
−1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

+ α2

0
0
−1
−1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

+ α3

−1
0
−1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

+ α4

0
0
0
0
−1
0
−1
0
1
0
1
0

+ α5

0
−1
0
−1
1
0
1
0
−1
0
0
1

.
Thus, any strategy-proof sharing rule f is written as
f(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
1
3) = (x
1
1, x
1
2, x
1
3) = (1− α1 − α3, α1 − α4 + α5, α3 + α4 − α5)
f(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
1
3) = (x
1
1, x
2
2, x
2
3) = (1− α1 − α3, α1, α3)
f(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
1
3) = (x
2
1, x
1
2, x
3
3) = (1− α1 − α5, α1 − α4 + α5, α4)
f(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
1
3) = (x
2
1, x
2
2, x
4
3) = (1− α1 − α5, α1, α5)
f(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
2
3) = (x
3
1, x
3
2, x
1
3) = (1− α2 − α3, α2 − α4 + α5, α3 + α4 − α5)
f(θ21, θ
1
2, θ
2
3) = (x
3
1, x
4
2, x
2
3) = (1− α2 − α3, α2, α3)
f(θ11, θ
2
2, θ
2
3) = (x
4
1, x
3
2, x
3
3) = (1− α2 − α5, α2 − α4 + α5, α4)
f(θ21, θ
2
2, θ
2
3) = (x
4
1, x
4
2, x
4
3) = (1− α2 − α5, α2, α5),
for some (α1, α2, α3, α4, α5) ∈
{
(α1, α2, α3, α4, α5) ∈ [0, 1]5
∣∣ α1+α3 ≤ 1, α2+
α3 ≤ 1, α4 ≤ α1 + α5 ≤ 1, α4 ≤ α2 + α5 ≤ 1, and α5 ≤ α3 + α4 ≤ 1
}
.
The strategy-proof sharing rule introduced in Example 1 is given by
(α1, α2, α3, α4, α5) = (0.1, 0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5). ¥
5 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
In this section, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-
istence of a non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rule. We first provide the
following lemma, which is concerned with the properties of the coefficient
matrix A.
Lemma 1. Consider the linear system Ax = 1. Then the following state-
ments hold whenever n ≥ 2:
(i) rankA = mn − (m− 1)n.
(ii) The dimension of the solution space of the linear system is
nmn−1 − {mn − (m− 1)n}.
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The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix. We next look for the
relationship between the constancy of the strategy-proof sharing rule and the
dimension of the solution set of the linear system. The following theorem is a
fundamental result, which follows from the fact that n−1 linear independent
vectors are necessary to express all of the constant sharing rules.
Theorem 2. Consider the linear system Ax = 1. Then the dimension of
the solution set of the linear system is greater than or equal to n− 1.
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in the Appendix. Theorem 2 tells us
that in order for all of the constant sharing rules, each of which is the typical
strategy-proof sharing rule, to be obtained as solutions of the linear system,
it is necessary that the dimension of the solution space of it is greater than
or equal to n − 1. This leads to the following theorem, which states that
(n− 1)-dimensional solution space is not enough for a non-constant sharing
rule to be represented as a solution of the linear system.
Theorem 3. Consider the linear system Ax = 1. Then, only the constant
sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if the dimension of the
solution set of the linear system is equal to n− 1.
The proof of Theorem 3 is in the Appendix. Theorem 3 implies that the
existence of the non-constant and strategy-proof sharing rule depends on the
dimension of the solution set of the linear system. Combined with Lemma
1, Theorem 3 implies that it also depends on the number of agents and that
of admissible types whether or not there exists a non-constant sharing rule
satisfying strategy-proofness, which is formally stated in Theorem 4 below.
Theorem 4. Consider the linear system Ax = 1. Then, there exists a
non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rule if and only if n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2.
Theorem 4 indicates that non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rules as
well as all of the constant sharing rules appear as solutions to the linear
equations whenever there are three or more agents, each of whom has at
least two types. Furthermore, the theorem tells us that more complicated
sharing rules emerge as either the number of agents or that of types increases,
since the dimension of the solution space of the linear system becomes large
as either of these numbers grows.
Before proceeding to the proof, we present two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let g(s) be a polynomial of degree 3. If g satisfies
(i) g(1) ≥ 0 and
(ii) g′(s) > 0 for any s ≥ 1,
then g(s) > 0 for any s ≥ 2.
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Lemma 3. Let g(s) be a polynomial of degree l ≥ 4. If g satisfies
(i) g(1) ≥ 0,
(ii) gi(1) > 0 for any i with 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 3, and
(iii) gl−2(s) > 0 for any s ≥ 1,
then g(s) > 0 for any s ≥ 2, where gi(s) := dig(s)
dsi
.
The proof of Lemma 2 is analogous to that of Lemma 3, which is in the
Appendix. Now we prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. By the contrapositive of Theorem 3, Theorem 4 is
equivalent to the following statement: the dimension of the solution set
of the linear system is not n − 1 if and only if n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2. To-
gether with Lemma 1-(ii) and Theorem 2, Theorem 4 is also equivalent to
the following statement:
nmn−1 − {mn − (m− 1)n} > n− 1 if and only if n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2. (∗)
So, we prove (∗) instead of the original statement.
The if part: Given n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1, define a continuous function g as
follows:
g(m) :=
{
nmn−1 − {mn − (m− 1)n}}− (n− 1)
= (m− 1)n −mn + nmn−1 − n+ 1.
In order to prove the if part of (∗), for any integer n ≥ 3, it is sufficient to
show that g(m) > 0 whenever m ≥ 2.
Case 1: n ≥ 4.
By Lemma 3, in order to prove that g(m) > 0 for any m ≥ 2, it suffices to
verify that (i) g(1) ≥ 0, (ii) gi(1) > 0 for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 3, and (iii)
gn−2(m) > 0 for all m ≥ 1. Differentiating g(m) i times, we get
gi(m) = n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · (n− (i− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
{
(m− 1)n−i −mn−i + (n− i)mn−(i+1)
}
.
First we check g(1) ≥ 0.
g(1) = (1− 1)n − 1n + n · 1n−1 − n+ 1
= 0 ≥ 0.
Second we verify that gi(1) > 0 for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 3.
gi(1) = n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · (n− (i− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
{
(1− 1)n−i − 1n−i + (n− i) · 1n−(i+1)
}
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= n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · (n− (i− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
(n− (i+ 1)).
Since 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 3, it must hold that 4 ≤ (n − (i − 1)) ≤ n and 2 ≤
(n − (i + 1)) ≤ n − 2. Hence, we conclude that gi(1) > 0 for all i with
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 3.
Finally we confirm that gn−2(m) > 0 for all m ≥ 1.
gn−2(m) = n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · (n− ((n− 2)− 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2
×
{
(m− 1)n−(n−2) −mn−(n−2) + (n− (n− 2))mn−((n−2)+1)
}
= n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2
×{(m− 1)2 −m2 + 2m}
= n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2
×1 > 0.
Therefore, gn−2(m) > 0 for all m ≥ 1.
Case 2: n = 3.
By Lemma 2, in order to show that g(m) > 0 for any m ≥ 2, it is sufficient
to check that (i) g(1) ≥ 0 and (ii) g′(m) > 0 for any m ≥ 1. In a way similar
to Case 1, we can verify that g fulfills (i) and (ii).
The only if part: Suppose not, then n = 2 or m = 1. It is easy to check
that the inequality nmn−1 − {mn − (m− 1)n} > n− 1 does not hold when
n = 2 or m = 1.
Theorem 4 gives a condition that is necessary and sufficient for the ex-
istence of a sharing rule satisfying non-constancy and strategy-proofness.
It turns out that, under the realistic assumption that each agent has more
than one type, we can design non-constant and strategy-proof sharing rules
whenever there are at least three agents, while we can never when there are
only two agents. This makes a critical difference between the two-agent and
n-agent case, where n ≥ 3. The result parallels the conjecture of Zhou (1991)
which states that there exists a rule that satisfies non-constancy, strategy-
proofness, and Pareto efficiency in n-agent pure exchange economies, where
n ≥ 3, whereas there does not exist such a rule in two-agent pure exchange
economies.7
7To be precise, Zhou (1991) conjectured that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness and
Pareto efficiency if and only if it is inversely-dictatorial in pure exchange economies. Note
that there exists an inversely-dictatorial and non-constant rule if there are three or more
agents, while every inversely-dictatorial rule is constant (because it is dictatorial) in two-
agent pure exchange economies (see Zhou (1991) or Kato and Ohseto (2002) for details).
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6 Fairness
In this section, we search for rules satisfying strategy-proofness and fairness.
As the notion of fairness, we adopt symmetry , which is one of the weakest
properties that pertain to fairness. Symmetry requires that if agents an-
nounce identical types, they should receive the same shares.
Definition 4 (Symmetry). A sharing rule f satisfies symmetry if, for all
θ ∈ Θm and all i, j ∈ N , if θi = θj , then fi(θ) = fj(θ).
The following theorem asserts that symmetry, strategy-proofness, and
non-constancy are jointly inconsistent.
Theorem 5. There is no sharing rule f satisfying symmetry, strategy-
proofness, and non-constancy.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there does exist a sharing rule f that
satisfies symmetry, strategy-proofness, and non-constancy. Consider θ1 =
(θ11, θ
1
2, θ
1
3, . . . , θ
1
n) ∈ Θm . Then, by symmetry, we have f(θ1) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Step 1 : f(θ′i, θ
1
−i) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) for all i ∈ N and all θ′i ∈ Θmi .
Suppose not, then, for some i ∈ N and some θ′i ∈ Θmi , we have f(θ′i, θ1−i) 6=
(1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Case 1-1 : fi(θ′i, θ
1
−i) 6= 1/n.
Theorem 1 implies fi(θ1) = fi(θ′i, θ
1
−i) = 1/n: a contradiction.
Case 1-2 : fh(θ′i, θ
1
−i) 6= 1/n for some h ∈ N \ {i}.
By the argument of Case 1-1, we have fi(θ′i, θ
1
−i) = 1/n. Symmetry implies
that fg(θ′i, θ
1
−i) = fh(θ
′
i, θ
1
−i) for any g, h ∈ N \{i}. Since
∑
i∈N fi(θ
′
i, θ
1
−i) =
1, these imply that fg(θ′i, θ
1
−i) = fh(θ
′
i, θ
1
−i) = 1/n for any g, h ∈ N \ {i}: a
contradiction.
Step 2 : f(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) for all i ∈ N , all j ∈ N , all θ′i ∈ Θmi ,
and all θ′′j ∈ Θmj .
Suppose not, then there exist i ∈ N , j ∈ N , θ′i ∈ Θmi , and θ′′j ∈ Θmj such
that f(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) 6= (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Case 2-1 : fi(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) 6= 1/n.
By Step 1, it holds that f(θ′′j , θ
1
−j) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). It follows from Theorem
1 that fi(θ′′j , θ
1
−j) = fi(θ
′
i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) = 1/n: a contradiction.
Case 2-2 : fj(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) 6= 1/n.
This case follows from an argument similar to Case 2-1.
Case 2-3: fh(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) 6= 1/n for some h ∈ N \ {i, j}.
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The arguments of Cases 2-1 and 2-2 imply fi(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) = fj(θ
′
i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) =
1/n. By symmetry, it must hold that fg(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) = fh(θ
′
i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j)
for any g, h ∈ N \ {i, j}. Since ∑i∈N fi(θ′i, θ′′j , θ1−i,j) = 1, it follows that
fg(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) = fh(θ
′
i, θ
′′
j , θ
1
−i,j) = 1/n for any g, h ∈ N \ {i, j}: a contra-
diction.
Step 3 : f(θ′i, θ
′′
j , θ
′′′
k , θ
1
−i,j,k) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) for all i ∈ N , all j ∈ N , all
k ∈ N , all θ′i ∈ Θmi , all θ′′j ∈ Θmj , and all θ′′′k ∈ Θmk .
The argument for Step 3 is analogous to the arguments for Steps 1 and 2.
Iteration of similar arguments for further agents establishes that, for any
θ˜ ∈ Θm ,
f(θ˜) = f(θ1) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n),
which contradicts non-constancy.
Theorem 5 implies that if a sharing rule satisfies symmetry and strategy-
proofness, then it is a constant sharing rule. Hence, as we formalize below,
we can conclude that it is only the equal sharing rule that satisfies symmetry
and strategy-proofness.
Definition 5 (The Equal Sharing Rule). A sharing rule f is the equal
sharing rule if, for all θ ∈ Θm ,
f(θ) = (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Corollary 1. A sharing rule f satisfies symmetry and strategy-proofness if
and only if it is the equal sharing rule.
Corollary 1 parallels the result of Ching (1994) in the division problem
with single-peaked preferences, which states that a rule satisfies symme-
try, strategy-proofness, and Pareto efficiency if and only if it is the uniform
rule.8 Ching’s result is a generalization of Sprumont (1991)’s character-
ization that asserts that a rule satisfies anonymity (or equivalently envy-
freeness), strategy-proofness, and Pareto efficiency if and only if it is the
uniform rule.9
It is easy to show that only the equal sharing rule satisfies envy-freeness.
Combined with Corollary 1, this implies that envy-freeness is equivalent
to the conjunction of strategy-proofness and symmetry in our environment.
The equivalence between envy-freeness and symmetry plus strategy-proofness
fails to hold in Sprumont’s environment. Therefore, it is a difference between
our environment and Sprumont’s whether the equivalence holds or not.
8As mentioned in the Introduction, the uniform rule is equivalent to the equal sharing
rule in our environment.
9Envy-freeness is a requirement that each agent should never prefer someone else’s
share to her own, which is first introduced by Foley (1967).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have characterized the class of strategy-proof sharing
rules and provided a way to find all of the strategy-proof sharing rules.
In Theorem 1, we have shown that strategy-proof sharing rules have the
quasi-constancy property: each agent never changes her own share through
misrepresentation of her types. Since quasi-constancy plus non-constancy
implies bossiness, the theorem implies that strategy-proof sharing rules are
bossy or constant. Hence, combined with the fact that strategy-proofness
plus non-bossiness implies coalitional strategy-proofness, the theorem leads
to an impossibility result: there is no sharing rule that satisfies coalitional
strategy-proofness and non-constancy. Thus, Theorem 1 seems to be a pos-
sibility result, but it has a somewhat negative implication.
In Section 5, we have established a fundamental result concerning the
dimension of the solution space of the linear system constructed in Section
4: every strategy-proof sharing rule can be represented as a solution of the
linear system, only when the dimension of the solution set is greater than or
equal to the number of agents minus one. Furthermore, we have established
that more non-constant , strategy-proof sharing rules emerge, according as
the dimension of the solution space, which is determined by the number
of agents and that of types, becomes greater than the number of agents
minus one. Thus, we have shown that there are non-constant, strategy-proof
sharing rules, when there are at least three agents who each have at least
two types. However, we have not yet found an algorithm for finding such
rules (although we know that it is possible to find such rules by solving the
linear system constructed in Section 4). It would be an interesting further
research to provide such an algorithm.
The model considered in this paper is related to Sprumont (1991)’s model
and the pure exchange economy model considered in Zhou (1991), Barbera`
and Jackson (1995), Kato and Ohseto (2002), and others. So, we have ob-
tained some results similar to the ones given by them. However, we have
provided two results, each of which held only in our model: one is the incon-
sistency between non-constancy and strategy-proofness plus non-bossiness
(or equivalently the inconsistency between non-constancy and coalitional
strategy-proofness), and the other is the equivalence between envy-freeness
and strategy-proofness plus symmetry. The difference is due to the fact that,
in our model, no one is indifferent between any pair of outcomes such that
she receives distinct shares.
Strategy-proofness is closely related to Nash implementability, since strategy-
proofness is implied by monotonicity that is both necessary and sufficient
for Nash implementation in our environment.10 It is easy to show that
10Necessity follows immediately from Maskin (1999) which showed that monotonicity
is necessary for Nash implementation. In the three- or more-agent case, sufficiency also
follows from Maskin (1999) that proved that monotonicity and no veto power are sufficient
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monotonicity is equivalent to constancy in our environment. Therefore, ev-
ery strategy-proof sharing rule is Nash implementable when there are only
two agents, since it is a constant sharing rule. On the other hand, when
there are three or more agents, all of the strategy-proof sharing rules are
not Nash implementable. Indeed, all of the bossy strategy-proof sharing
rules are not implementable in Nash equilibria, because they violate mono-
tonicity in our environment. In short, only the constant sharing rules are
Nash implementable no matter how many agents there are.
It is also easy to check that, in our environment, monotonicity is equiv-
alent to the rectangular property which is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for secure implementation, i.e., double implementation in Nash and
dominant strategy equilibria (See Saijo, Sjo¨stro¨m, and Yamato (2003) for
details). Hence, we reaches a conclusion similar to one about Nash im-
plementation: only the constant sharing rules are secure implementable,
whereas all of the non-constant and strategy-proof sharing rules are not se-
cure implementable. As already remarked, the constant sharing rules are
distinguished from the other sharing rules by a lot of properties, such as
fairness, coalitional strategy-proofness, implementability, etc. This appears
to be a reason why the non-constant sharing rules are not used in practice,
even if they satisfies strategy-proofness.
In this paper, we have searched for bossy and strategy-proof rules by
constructing a system of linear equations. The way of finding such rules
developed here could help search for bossy, strategy-proof rules in other en-
vironments, including pure exchange economies where non-bossy , strategy-
proof rules have been looked for.
for Nash implementation, together with the fact that no veto power is automatically satis-
fied in our environment. In the two-agent case, sufficiency follows from the fact that only
the constant sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness which is implied by monotonicity, a
necessary condition for Nash implementation.
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Appendix
In the Appendix, we first provide a remark, which concerns the constant
sharing rule, and then provide some proofs.
Remark 1. Every constant sharing rule can be written as a vector
(x¯1, x¯1, . . . , x¯1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, x¯2, x¯2, . . . , x¯2︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, x¯3, x¯3, . . . , x¯3︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , x¯n, x¯n, . . . , x¯n︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t
for some (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, . . . , x¯n) ∈ X, where the constant sharing rule always
assigns x¯1 to agent 1, x¯2 to agent 2, x¯3 to agent 3, . . . , x¯n to agent n.
Proof of Lemma 1-(i). Given n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1, define matrix Ar by
arpq =
{
apq if q ∈
{
(r − 1)mn−1 + 1, (r − 1)mn−1 + 2, . . . , rmn−1} ,
0 otherwise,
where arpq and apq denote the pq-th elements of A
r and A, respectively.
Then, we obtain the following matrices A1, A2, . . . , An.
A1 =

1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0

,
A2 =

0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0

,
...
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An =

0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 ··· 0
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1

.
Note that A1 +A2 + · · ·+An = A. Let (rh) := r!h!(r−h!) .
Consider matrix A1. By means of Gaussian elimination, we obtain
rankA1 = mn−1.
Consider (A1 +A2). By Gaussian elimination, we have
rank(A1 +A2) = 2mn−1 − (mn−2)
= 2mn−1 −
(
2
2
)
mn−2(−1)2.
Consider (A1 +A2 +A3). By applying Gaussian elimination, we get
rank(A1 +A2 +A3) = 3mn−1 − (3mn−2 −mn−3)
= 3mn−1 −
{(
3
2
)
mn−2(−1)2 +
(
3
3
)
mn−3(−1)3
}
= 3mn−1 −
3∑
h=2
(
3
h
)
mn−h(−1)h.
Thus, by the construction of A, we can find that
rank(A1 +A2 + · · ·+Ar) =

mn−1 if r = 1,
rmn−1 −
r∑
h=2
(
r
h
)
mn−h(−1)h if r ≥ 2.
Therefore, we establish that
rankA = rank(A1 +A2 + · · ·+An)
= nmn−1 −
n∑
h=2
(
n
h
)
mn−h(−1)h
= nmn−1 −
n∑
h=2
(
n
h
)
mn−h(−1)h + (mn −mn)
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= mn −
{
n∑
h=2
(
n
h
)
mn−h(−1)h − nmn−1 +mn
}
= mn −
{
n∑
h=2
(
n
h
)
mn−h(−1)h + n!
1!(n− 1)!m
n−1(−1)1 + n!
0!n!
mn(−1)0
}
= mn −
{
n∑
h=2
(
n
h
)
mn−h(−1)h +
(
n
1
)
mn−1(−1)1 +
(
n
0
)
mn(−1)0
}
= mn −
n∑
h=0
(
n
h
)
mn−h(−1)h
= mn − (m− 1)n,
whenever n ≥ 2.
Proof of Lemma 1-(ii). Let c1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0)t be a constant shar-
ing rule where agent 1 gets the entire share of the good. Since the constant
sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness, c1 is a particular solution of the
linear system Ax = 1. So, the solution set of the linear system is the affine
space {
x ∈ Rnmn−1
∣∣∣ x = c1 +w for some w ∈ Null(A)} .
Since the dimension of the affine space is that of Null(A), and since dimNull(A)
is equal to the number of variables nmn−1 minus rank(A), the dimension of
the solution space is equal to nmn−1 − {mn − (m− 1)n}.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose to the contrary that the dimension of the so-
lution space of the linear system is less than n−1, i.e., dimNull(A) < n−1.
Except for the particular solution c1 defined in the proof of Lemma 1-(ii),
the linear system Ax = 1 must have n− 1 kinds of solutions such that
c2 = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t,
c3 = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t,
...
cn = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t,
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because each of the solutions c2, c3, . . . , cn is a constant sharing rule, which
satisfies strategy-proofness. It follows from the definition of the solution set
provided in the proof of Lemma 1-(ii) that the vectors
c2 − c1 = (−1,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t,
c3 − c1 = (−1,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t,
...
cn − c1 = (−1,−1, . . . ,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
, . . . , 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mn−1
)t
are all contained in Null(A). Since the n−1 vectors c2−c1, c3−c1, . . . , cn−c1
are linearly independent, dimNull(A) = n − 1: a contradiction because we
have assumed that dimNull(A) < n− 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. The if part: Suppose not, then there exists a non-
constant sharing rule satisfying strategy-proofness. Let c′ denote the non-
constant sharing rule. Then c2 − c1, c3 − c1, . . . , cn − c1, and c′ − c1 are
linearly independent; otherwise, for some (r2, r3, . . . , rn), it must hold that
c′ − c1 = r2(c2 − c1) + r3(c3 − c1) + · · ·+ rn(cn − c1)
c′ = {1− (r2 + r3 + · · ·+ rn)}c1 + r2c2 + r3c3 + · · ·+ rncn,
which contradicts the fact that c′ is a non-constant sharing rule. Conse-
quently, Null(A) has n linear independent vectors c2−c1, c3−c1, . . . , cn−c1,
and c′ − c1, so dimNull(A) = n: a contradiction because dimNull(A) =
n− 1.
The only if part: Suppose that only the constant sharing rule satisfies
strategy-proofness. Then the linear system Ax = 1 must have the solu-
tions c1, c2, . . . , cn defined in the proofs of Lemma 1-(ii) and Theorem 2,
because each of the solutions is a constant sharing rule satisfying strategy-
proofness. It follows from the same argument as in the proof of Theorem
2 that dimNull(A) = n − 1. Since any other constant sharing rule can be
written as c1 plus a linear combination of c2 − c1, c3 − c1, . . . , cn − c1, the
dimension of Null(A) still remains n− 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Since fn−3(1) > 0 and fn−2(s) > 0 for all s ≥ 1 by
Conditions (ii) and (iii) respectively, it must hold that fn−3(s) > 0 for all
s ≥ 1. In conjunction with fn−4(1) > 0, this implies that fn−4(s) > 0 for all
22
s ≥ 1. Similarly together with fn−5(1) > 0, this implies that fn−5(s) > 0
for all s ≥ 1. Iterations of this argument implies that f1(s) > 0 for all s ≥ 1.
Combining Condition (i), i.e., f(1) ≥ 0, we conclude that f(s) > 0 for any
s ≥ 2.
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